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A landmark. A victory for “gay rights.” An example of judicial 
activism. 
Each of these appellations is an accurate descriptor of the Court’s 
decision in United States v. Windsor, rendered on the last day of the 2012–
2013 term. By a bare majority, the Court declared Section 3 of the 
Congressional Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prohibiting federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages unconstitutional. The Court resolved the 
threshold issue of whether it had Article III power to hear the case, given 
the unusual posture of the litigation, in favor of rendering a decision, unlike 
the outcome in the companion case of Perry v. Hollingsworth involving the 
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8.1 The Court’s reasoning 
included a discussion of Congressional power to pass DOMA, given that 
marriage and other family matters are generally within the province of the 
states under federalism as it has developed in the United States. Ultimately, 
however, the issue was not one of Congressional power. Instead, the 
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1 See Caitlin Borgmann, Case Comment: Hollingsworth v. Perry, CUNY Law Review: 
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majority concluded that DOMA’s Section 3 violated the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. 
The facts underlying United States v. Windsor have been subject to 
much media attention. Edith Windsor is a sympathetic and charismatic 
plaintiff, aged 83 at the time of the decision, whose monetarily specific 
injury consisted of the $363,053 she paid to the federal government in 
federal estate taxes because of the non-recognition of her same-sex marriage 
to her deceased partner, Thea Spyer.2 The couple had been married in 
Canada in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by their home state of 
New York when Thea Syper died in 2009, although New York itself did not 
itself license same-sex marriages until 2011.3 Thus, except for the operation 
of DOMA Section 3, Edith Windsor would have been considered a 
“spouse” under federal law and entitled to the spousal exemption from 
estate tax. 
These clear facts establishing Windsor’s standing to invoke the Article 
III power of the federal courts to hear cases and controversies contrast with 
the muddled status of the opposing party. Although the defendant 
in Windsor v. United States is nominally the United States government, the 
Department of Justice ceased defending the constitutionality of Section 3 of 
DOMA in February 2011. Reversing its previous course of a vigorous 
defense of DOMA,4 Attorney General Holder duly notified Congress by 
letter pursuant to 28 USC 530D that “the President has concluded” that 
Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to legally married same-sex couples, is 
unconstitutional.5 Yet Holder’s letter also specifically stated that Section 3 
would “continue to be enforced by the Executive Branch,” noting the 
Executive’s duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and 
recognizing “the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims 
                                                
2 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (excluding from taxation “any interest in property which passes 
or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse”). 
3 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a. Note that New York’s highest court had previously 
rejected a challenge to New York’s ban of same-sex marriage in Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006). 
4 See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, DOJ Defends DOMA, Constitutional Law Prof Blog 
(June 12, 2009) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2009/06/doj-defends-doma.html; 
Ruthann Robson, Obama DOJ Appeals Decision that DOMA Section 3 is Unconstitutional, 
Constitutional Law Prof Blog (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/10/obama-doj-appeals-decision-that-doma-
section-3-is-unconstitutional.html. 
5 See Ruthann Robson, Obama DOJ: Holder Announces DOMA Will Not be Defended 
Because it is Unconstitutional, Constitutional Law Prof Blog (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/02/obama-doj-holder-announces-doma-
will-not-be-defended-because-it-is-unconstitutional.html(summarizing and linking to 
letter). 
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raised.”6 The defense of the constitutionality of the DOMA was taken up by 
House of Representatives’ Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), who 
intervened in Windsor as well as many other cases, at a cost to taxpayers 
estimated to be more than three million dollars. BLAG unsuccessfully 
argued the constitutionality of DOMA’s Section 3 in the district court and 
in the Second Circuit. When the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Windsor, the threshold question was whether the Court had 
power to hear the case given that the United States Solicitor General (who 
had filed the petition for certiorari before the Second Circuit had issued its 
decision in Windsor) agreed with its “opposing” party and that the statute’s 
constitutionality was being defended by a nongovernmental party, BLAG. 
In short: where was the case and controversy among the parties? The 
Solicitor General for the government agreed with the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in favor of Windsor that BLAG was not an actual party who could 
meet the classic requirements of Article III standing focusing on injury. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, focused on the fact that the 
United States government did have a specific economic injury at stake — 
the $363,053 it still had not refunded to Edith Windsor. Given this tangible 
issue, the majority reasoned that the question of standing was less an issue 
of Article III power than of “prudential problems inherent in the 
Executive’s unusual position.”7 But while such problems should not be 
disregarded, any prudential problems in Windsor were more than addressed 
by “BLAG’s sharp adversarial presentation of the issues” and “capable 
defense of the law.”8 Indeed, BLAG, as well as Windsor and the Solicitor 
General, all agreed that the Court had power to hear the case, a situation 
which led the Court to appoint an amicus curiae to argue that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction.9 Justice Alito, otherwise dissenting, also agreed that the 
Court had power to hear the case given BLAG’s appearance as a 
party.10 For Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts, however, the Court was 
                                                
6 The letter states: “To that end, the President has instructed Executive agencies to 
continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive’s obligation to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 
or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality. This 
course of action respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA, and it 
recognizes the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.” 
7 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013). 
8 Id. at 2688. 
9 Id. at 2684. For my discussion of Professor Vicki Jackson’s brief, see Ruthann 
Robson, Daily Read: Vicki Jackson on BLAG’s Lack of Standing in Windsor, the DOMA 
Case, Constitutional Law Prof Blog (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/01/daily-read-vicki-jackson-on-
blags-lack-of-standing-in-windsor-the-doma-case.html. 
10 Alito concluded that “in the narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down 
an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act, Congress both has 
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wrong to hear the case: it was being “hungry,” and hearing the case further 
“enthroned” the Court above the other branches.11 This view would 
command a majority when considering California’s Proposition 8 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry. But in Windsor it was a decided minority, in part 
because of the constitutional distinctions in the judiciary’s role in the 
separation of powers context and the federalism context. 
Federalism was also essential to the Court’s opinion in Windsor in its 
discussion of the merits. Simply stated: marriage is generally a matter of 
state law and federal definitions of marriage generally rely upon validity in 
the state.12 DOMA changed this usual arrangement by carving out a specific 
type of marriage in which this usual rule would not apply. For the Court, 
this then led to the question of whether Congressional departure from the 
common rule in order to “impose restrictions and disabilities” causing a 
“resulting injury and indignity” is unconstitutional.13 The Court concluded 
that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect” and 
by doing so, the statute “violates basic due process and equal protection 
principles applicable to the Federal Government” under the Fifth 
Amendment.14 The Court’s opinion describes DOMA as relegating same-
sex couples to an “unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage” and 
most often sounds in principles of equality and equal protection.15 However, 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court also frequently refers to dignity and 
describes the purpose and effect of DOMA as demeaning. The 
constitutional conjunction of these concepts is specifically addressed by the 
Court near the end of the opinion: 
 
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal 
protection of the laws. See Bolling, 347 U.S., at 499–500, 74 S.Ct. 
693; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 217–218, 115 
S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). While the Fifth Amendment itself 
withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way 
this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                       
standing to defend the undefended statute and is a proper party to do so.” Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. at 2714 (Alito J., dissenting). 
11 Although Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately, he joined Part I of Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion. Id.at 2698 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
12 One exception is immigration law. See Janet Calvo, U.S. v. Windsor’s Impact on 
Immigration Law, CUNY Law Review: Footnote Forum (Sept. 
2013), http://www.cunylawreview.org/?p=812.  
13 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
14 The Court cites Bolling v. Sharpe, for the proposition that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the federal government through the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 2693 (citing 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). 
15 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and 
all the better understood and preserved.16 
 
The final paragraph of the Court’s opinion then concludes: 
 
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those 
persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State. 
DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to 
recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a 
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds 
to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials, and 
indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their 
own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of 
others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes 
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking 
to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages 
less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. This opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful 
marriages.17 
 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented specially to emphasize the majority’s 
limitation to same-sex marriages valid under state law.18 For Justice Scalia, 
dissenting, that limitation is disingenuous, with the Court’s opinion “leaving 
the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term.”19 Indeed, 
Scalia provides veritable instructions to litigants wishing to 
apply Windsor to state laws limiting same-sex marriage: he takes three 
passages from the Court’s opinion and demonstrates their ease of alteration 
to apply to state laws, arguing that the similarly “transposable passages” 
abound. He accuses the Court of indulging in “a lecture on how superior the 
majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to the 
Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it.”20 He adds: “I promise you 
this: The only thing that will ‘confine’ the Court’s holding is its sense of 
what it can get away with.”21 In his dissent, Justice Alito criticizes the 
Court’s doctrinal laxity, but also provides his own discussion of marriage. 
                                                
16 Id. at 2695. 
17 Id. at 2695–2696. 
18 Id. at 2696 (Roberts J., dissenting) (“The majority goes out of its way to make this 
explicit in the penultimate sentence of its opinion” by confining its holding to lawful same-
sex marriages already recognized by a state). 
19 Id. at 2705 (Scalia J., dissenting). Justice Scalia later repeats the shoe-dropping 
image: “As far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of 
listening and waiting for the other shoe.” Id. at 2710. 
20 Id. at 2709. 
21 Id. 
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Justice Alito advances two views of marriage, one he labels the 
“traditional” (or “conjugal”) view and the other he labels the “consent-
based” view. He argues that legislatures, not the Court, should be deciding 
between these two views given that the Constitution itself “does not codify 
either of these views” although he quickly adds that it would be difficult to 
find an American at the time of the adoption of the Constitution who did not 
“take the traditional view for granted.”22 Justice Alito also expresses his 
personal preference for this traditional view, perhaps most vividly in his 
footnote 7, discussing the district court proceedings not in Windsor but 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Proposition 8 litigation.23 
Thus, by a 5–4 decision, the Court rendered a landmark victory for “gay 
rights” by declaring the unconstitutionality of DOMA, a statute enacted by 
Congress. Windsor’s landmark status is assured because it marks the first 
time the Court has decisively entered the fray of same-sex marriage 
controversies, and this status is even more assured given that it refused to 
do so in the companion case of Hollingsworth v. Perry. As a victory for 
“gay rights,” Windsor builds upon the Court’s opinions in Romer v. Evans, 
decided in 1996, in which the Court held that Colorado’s Amendment 2 
banning administrative and local anti-discrimination provisions for sexual 
minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause, and Lawrence v. Texas, 
decided in 2003, in which the Court reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, and held 
that a statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy violated the Due Process 
Clause. And Windsor meets the classic description of an activist decision, in 
that the Court “strikes down” a statute enacted through a democratic 
process. 
But Windsor is also decidedly predictable. It shows a Court that is 
deeply divided and dominated by personalities. Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the Court in Windsor — as he did in Romer and Lawrence and as many 
predicted he would — fails to provide a rigorous analysis.24 Read aside the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Windsor, or the First Circuit’s opinion declaring 
DOMA unconstitutional, or various district court opinions, or even Eric 
Holder’s letter describing the conclusion that DOMA was unconstitutional, 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court seems as vague and unfocused as the 
dissenting opinions criticize it for being. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion 
is as vituperative as his dissenting opinions in Romer and Lawrence, full of 
colorful language, dire predictions, and sounding more political than 
                                                
22 Id. at 2718–19 (Alito J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 2718, n.7. 
24 See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Online Same-Sex Marriage Symposium: Toward a More 
Perfect Analysis, SCOTUSblog (September 19, 2012), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-same-sex-marriage-symposium-toward-a-
more-perfect-analysis/. 
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judicial. Perhaps most disturbing are his accusations that the majority 
simply aggrandizes power to itself by declaring a democratically enacted 
law unconstitutional: this critique of judicial activism was seemingly 
irrelevant when he joined the Court’s 5–4 decision rendered the day 
before Windsor, striking down a section of the federal Voting Rights 
Act.25 Moreover, absent from Scalia’s opinion in Windsor is any serious 
engagement with the federalism question, a notable flaw from a “states’ 
rights” perspective. Further, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion is not 
balanced by a concurring opinion from Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, or 
Kagan, which might have made the Court seem more fractured, but which 
could have advanced the intermediate level of scrutiny for sexual 
orientation classifications adopted by the Second Circuit. 
Finally, Windsor is predictable in this political moment in which “rights” 
are too often sentimentalized rather than taken seriously as springboards for 
social justice and in which sexual liberation has been domesticated by 
marriage equality.26 
The impact of Windsor is clear. The federal government has begun to 
treat bi-national same-sex couples on the same terms as opposite-sex 
couples, and federal benefits such as social security are already being 
altered. As to its effect on state laws, the precedential value of Windsor 
remains to be seen, but there is some indication that Scalia’s “shoe” is 
already dropping. Less than a month after the decision, a federal court used 
the opinion to support an injunction requiring the recognition of an out-of-
state same-sex marriage on a death certificate in Ohio, despite the state’s 
statutory and state constitutional DOMA.27 However, what is much more 
murky is whether Windsor will herald a new era of sexual freedom, 
including individual rights for persons not in married couples, and whether 
concerns of equality and dignity can be extended to reproductive rights, 
voting rights, prisoners’ rights, and other matters of social justice. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                
25 See Frank Deale, The VRA in the Wake of Shelby County, CUNY Law Review: 
Footnote Forum (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.cunylawreview.org/?p=696. 
26 For further elaboration of this argument, see Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, 
Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 709 (2002), available 
at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1885031. 
27 See Ruthann Robson, Ohio Federal Judge Enjoins State-DOMA: More Aftermath of 
Windsor, Constitutional Law Prof Blog (July 23, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/07/ohio-federal-judge-enjoins-state-doma-
.html. 
